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UNIVERSITY  OF CALIFORNIA,  SANTA  CRUZ  AND FEDERAL  RESERVE 
BANK  OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Recent  Central-Bank  Reforms  and  the 
Role  of  Price  Stability  as  the  Sole 
Objective  of  Monetary  Policy 
1. Introduction 
The wave  of recent  and  prospective  central-banking  reforms represent 
attempts  to develop  institutional  solutions  for the inflation bias that can 
arise under discretionary monetary policy. Institutional changes that oper- 
ate by reducing  the flexibility of the central bank to engage  in discretion- 
ary policy,  however,  run the risk of producing  suboptimal  stabilization 
policy.  The  task of  central bank  design  is  to balance  the  need  to limit 
average  inflation  with  the  need  to maintain  sufficient  flexibility for the 
central bank to respond  to economic  disturbances. 
Currently, there is strong  support  for the notion  that this balance can 
best  be achieved  by insulating  central banks from direct political influ- 
ences.  In  Europe,  for  example,  the  Maastricht  Treaty has  initiated  a 
broad  movement  to  rewrite  national  central-banking  legislation  to  re- 
duce the role of elected  governments  in the conduct  of monetary  policy. 
Central-banking reforms are also taking place among developing  nations 
(e.g.,  Chile,  Mexico)  and  the  economies  of  Central  Europe  (e.g.,  the 
Czech Republic,  Hungary). 
Another  recent trend is towards inflation targeting, either as an opera- 
tional  procedure  for  implementing  policy  or  as  a  formally  mandated 
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policy  objective.1 Inflation targeting has been  adopted  in the absence  of 
any  change  in  central bank legislation  (e.g.,  in Canada and  the  U.K.), 
and  in  combination  with  greater  central bank  independence  (e.g.,  in 
New  Zealand).2 Formal mandates  for price stability or inflation targeting 
requirements  represent  means  of institutionalizing  an achievable  objec- 
tive  for  monetary  policy.  By  mandating  outcomes,  however,  such  an 
approach potentially  restricts the flexibility of the central bank. 
An  alternative  to  mandated  objectives  or targeting  requirements  is 
offered by recent applications  of mechanism  design  theory to monetary 
policy.  Walsh  (1995b)  shows  how  an  optimal  policy  can be  sustained 
through  an incentive  contract that bases  the central bank's rewards  (or 
penalties)  solely  on the realized rate of inflation, a result generalized  and 
extended  by Persson  and Tabellini (1993).3 This would  seem  to provide 
some  theoretical  support for the establishment  of inflation targeting pro- 
cedures  or for making  price stability the sole objective of monetary  pol- 
icy. However,  the contracting approach has also emphasized  the need to 
give the central bank complete  discretion in the actual conduct of policy, 
while  targeting approaches  have emphasized  the need  to restrict central 
bank  flexibility  in  order  to  establish  the  credibility  of  a  low-inflation 
policy.  Despite  these  differences  in  perspectives,  the  finding  that  an 
optimal contract can be based  solely  on observed  inflation suggests  that 
a mandated  objective  to achieve  price stability or an inflation  targeting 
requirement  may  represent  alternative  means  of  institutionalizing  an 
optimal incentive  contract. 
Deriving  optimal  incentive  schemes  can provide  a normative  bench- 
mark against which  existing  or proposed  central bank institutions  can be 
compared.  Used  in this way, however,  the contracting perspective  pro- 
vides only qualified support for formally mandating a single objective for 
the  central  bank.  An  inflation-based  contract,  combined  with  central 
bank independence  in the actual implementation  of policy, achieves  opti- 
mal  policy  outcomes  only  if  the  central  bank  shares  social  values  in 
1. Swinburne  and Castello-Branco  (1991) provide  a comprehensive  summary  of the argu- 
ments  in support of establishing  price stability as the single objective of monetary policy. 
These  include  the  following:  as  a single  instrument,  monetary  policy  should  have  a 
single  target; monetary  policy  cannot  have  sustainable  real effects; and multiple  objec- 
tives are less  consistent  with  stable and credible monetary policy. 
2. For discussions  of recent experiences  with targeting,  see Ammer and Freeman (1994) or 
Fischer (1993). General discussions  of monetary targeting can be found in Goodhart and 
Vinals  (1994). An  extensive  collection  of papers  on various aspects  of targeting can be 
found  in Federal Reserve Bank of New  York (1990). 
3. In the standard Barro-Gordon  model,  optimality requires that these rewards and penal- 
ties be linear in the realized  rate of inflation.  See also Fratianni, von Hagen,  and Waller 
(1993). Tirole (1994) argues  more broadly for the usefulness  of incentive  theory  for the 
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trading off unemployment  and inflation  (Walsh, 1995b). When the cen- 
tral bank does  not share society's  preferences,  the optimal contract is no 
longer  a simple  function  of inflation; more complicated  incentives  must 
be generated  to insure that the central bank maintains low average infla- 
tion  while  still engaging  in  appropriate  stabilization  policies.  And  the 
tradeoffs  inherent  in the  conduct  of policy  suggest  that a central bank 
charged  only  with  the objective  of price stability should  not have  com- 
plete discretion  in setting  short-run targets. 
The contracting approach points generally in the direction of short-run 
adjustable inflation targets and considerable central bank independence. 
Such a system  gives  the central bank a great deal of instrument indepen- 
dence  but little  goal  independence,  in the  terminology  of Debelle  and 
Fischer (1994). And means to insure accountability for achieving specified 
goals  should  form a critical component  of any institutional  design.  The 
central-banking reforms carried out in New Zealand match well the impli- 
cations of the optimal-contracting  approach, although the effectiveness  of 
the New  Zealand reforms has yet to be tested.  Recent European reforms 
match less well, with greater emphasis being placed on achieving political 
independence  for central banks. Less attention has been given to insuring 
that the correct incentives  for making short-run policy tradeoffs are estab- 
lished,  nor has sufficient  attention  been  paid to insuring  accountability. 
2.  The  Role  of  a Formal  Mandate  for  Price  Stability 
If the government  can structure a contract that directly affects the incen- 
tives  faced  by  the  central bank,  it is possible  to eliminate  the inflation 
bias of discretionary  monetary  policy while  still leaving  the central bank 
free to respond  flexibly to economic  disturbances.  The contracts studied 
in Persson  and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995b) involved  central bank 
rewards and penalties  based only on the realized rate of inflation. In that 
sense,  they  can  be  interpreted  as  providing  support  for imbedding  a 
mandate  for  price  stability  into  central-banking  legislation.  The  basic 
insight  is that the standard  inflationary bias under  discretion  arises be- 
cause  the  monetary  authority  systematically  understates  the  marginal 
cost  of  faster  money  growth.  This  bias  can be  offset  if the  monetary 
authority  must  internalize  a penalty  function  that depends  directly on 
the realized  rate of inflation.  Once  the incentives  are right,  the central 
bank's discretion  and flexibility should  not be restricted. It is then possi- 
ble  both  to  eliminate  the  inflation  bias  and  to  achieve  optimal  policy 
responses  to shocks. 
Getting  the incentives  right through a contracting mechanism  may be 
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central  bank's  payoff  very  sensitive  to  policy  outcomes-may  be  re- 
quired,  and these  may be difficult to implement  in practice.4 And  if the 
government  can commit  to the optimal  contract with  central bank,  one 
might  ask why  the  government  is unable  to commit  to a low-inflation 
policy  in the  first place.  One  answer  is that contract incentives  can be 
"institutionalized";  the costs of changing  institutional structures are gen- 
erally viewed  as larger than  the  costs  of changing  government  policy. 
Objectives  formally  incorporated  into a central bank's enabling  legisla- 
tion  are likely  to be  more  difficult  to change  than  less  formally estab- 
lished  rewards  and penalities  and are therefore more likely to affect the 
inflation  outcomes  generated  by the  political process.  Requirements  of 
supermajorities,  or the  simple  requirement  that changes  be announced 
publicly,  can  represent  significant  costs  to  changing  policy  objectives. 
Making  price stability the sole  objective  of monetary  policy by a formal 
mandate  is  a way  of institutionalizing  the  idea  of a contract based  on 
inflation outcomes.5 
A key  characteristic of optimal  contracts  is that,  once  in place,  they 
allow the central bank complete  discretion to conduct stabilization policy. 
Similarly, mandating  that the central bank achieve price stability need not 
preclude  a role for stabilization policy. Tirole (1994) notes,  however,  that 
rules are often imposed  when  agents cannot be trusted with discrection. 
With monetary  policy, however,  the fear is that the government  will ex- 
ploit policy for short-term gain. This possibility  can be limited by forcing 
the government  to adhere  to a rule-such  as the gold  standard-or  by 
insulating  the central bank from direct political control via the establish- 
ment  of an independent  central bank.  The process  of delegation  through 
which  the government  assigns  immediate  responsibility  for the conduct 
of monetary  policy to a central bank is a means of restricting the strategy 
space available to the government. The extent to which  this delegation  is 
accompanied  by autonomy  corresponds  to the varying degrees  of central 
bank  independence  that have  been  the  focus  of much  recent  work.  If 
political pressures  generate a positive  inflation bias, delegation  can serve 
an important role in supporting  a credible low-inflation  environment. 
4. The optimal contract can be mimicked by a dismissal  rule that involves  firing the central 
banker  if inflation  exceeds  a critical value  (Walsh,  1993). If there  is  a supply  of  new 
central bankers,  the threat to fire is credible, since the government  can replace the fired 
central banker with a new  one.  Ex ante the government  also wants  low inflation and so 
is better off firing any  central banker who  succumbs  to the  temptation  to inflate  even 
though,  ex post,  the government  might be glad she did. In more complex environments 
than  that of  the  standard  Barro-Gordon  model,  the  optimal  contract may need  to be 
state-contingent  in complicated  ways. 
5. In fact,  from a longer-run  perspective,  the central bank's performance  is easy  to mea- 
sure, so the optimal incentive  scheme is likely to involve high-powered  incentives  tied to 
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The details associated  with  monetary  policy  delegation,  however,  are 
often designed  to restrict the strategy space of the central  bank.  For exam- 
ple,  inflation  targeting  rules,  such  as the multiperiod  horizon  targeting 
rule proposed  and  analyzed  by Canzoneri  (1985) under which  the cen- 
tral bank is required to achieve  a specific average rate of inflation over a 
period of fixed length,  restrict the space from which the central bank can 
choose  its  strategy.  A  mandated  objective  would  do  the  same.  As  a 
consequence,  the flexibility of the central bank is reduced,  and this may 
give  rise  to  a  cost  in  the  form  of  suboptimal  responses  to  economic 
disturbances. 
Besides reducing flexibility, mandated objectives and inflation targeting 
requirements  make inflation outcomes  the sole performance measure  of 
the central bank. As Walsh and Persson and Tabellini demonstrate,  how- 
ever, an optimal  contract can be based  on the inflation rate alone only if 
the monetary  authority shares society's  preferences between  output and 
inflation;  the  optimal  commitment  policy  is not sustained  if the central 
bank only cares about inflation.  The role of a low-inflation  mandate  or a 
mandate  for price stability in an optimal contract is to make a marginal 
adjustment in the central bank's policy objective, not to constitute the sole 
factor the central bank considers  in setting policy. 
If the central bank does  not share society's  preferences,  then  its con- 
tract will need to be more complex.  One means of reconciling the use of a 
mandate  for  price  stability  as  the  performance  measure  for monetary 
policy  in the long  run with  the need  to make tradeoffs for stabilization 
purposes  in  the  short  run  is  through  the  use  of  adjustable  short-run 
inflation  targets.  Short-run targets expressed  in terms of the price level 
or the rate of inflation provide a consistent  connection  between  long-run 
and  short-run  objectives.  However,  any  short-run  targeting  procedure 
risks imposing  unnecessary  fluctuations  on the economy  by restricting 
the central bank's flexibility unless  there is a mechanism  that allows  the 
target to be  state-contingent.  A surprising  result of the contracting ap- 
proach within the Barro-Gordon  model was the finding that the parame- 
ters  of  the  optimal  contract  were  not  state-contingent.  Unfortunately, 
this  is  not  likely  to  be  the  case  in  more  realistic  environments  (see 
Persson and Tabellini, 1993; Walsh, 1994; or Canzoneri, Nolan,  and Yates 
1995). 
Any mechanism  for adjusting  short-run inflation targets must face the 
inevitable  need  to make tradeoffs between  multiple objectives.6 An inde- 
pendent  central bank that focuses  always and exclusively  on price stabil- 
6. In a situation  characterized  by multiple  objectives,  one  would  expect to find both low- 
powered  contracts-payoffs  are not very sensitive  to observable outcomes-and  restric- 
tions on the agent's  freedom  to act (Holmstrom  and Milgrom,  1994). 242 *  WALSH 
ity is likely  to lose  its independence.7  Governments  in democracies  are 
accountable  to  the  electorate  and  as  such  are justified  in  feeling  they 
have the right to exert some influence  over monetary policy. Any mone- 
tary contract, therefore, will need to establish a mechanism  for adjudicat- 
ing  disagreements  between  the  government  and  the  central bank in a 
manner that preserves  the long-run  objectives of monetary policy.8 
Letting  the  government  play  a role in setting  short-run  targets runs 
the risk of compromising  long-run objectives.  An alternative approach is 
simply  to let the central bank establish  its own  objectives  (Garcia, 1993; 
Walsh,  1995a). It is shown  in Walsh (1995a) that the central banker may 
have  an incentive  to  opt  for an  excessive  focus  on  inflation  objectives 
even  when  society  places great weight  on minimizing  employment  fluc- 
tuations.  To understand  why,  recall that Rogoff (1985) showed  it would 
be optimal  for society  to appoint  a central banker who  places  a greater 
weight  on inflation objectives than society does.  But, by an exactly paral- 
lel argument,  the welfare  of such a conservative  central banker is maxi- 
mized if she can turn monetary policy over to an even more conservative 
central banker. Allowing  the central banker to delegate  is equivalent  to 
letting  her choose  her own  performance  measure  and leads to a central 
banker  who  places  zero  weight  on  unemployment  fluctuations.  This 
result  is  independent  of  the  weight  society  places  on  unemployment 
relative  to inflation.  And  while  central bankers often  justify a focus  on 
inflation  by minimizing  the impact they  can have  on the real economy 
and on unemployment,  the central bank will choose  to make inflation its 
sole  objective  no  matter how  large is the  short-run  effect  of monetary 
policy  on  output.9  This may help  to explain  why,  despite  the apparent 
concern  with  unemployment  expressed  by the general  public,  and  de- 
spite  the  important  short-run  effects  of monetary  policy  on unemploy- 
ment,  central bankers  are increasingly  calling for their mandates  to be 
narrowly focused  on inflation. 
This, if short-run objectives are to be established,  and the central bank 
is to be judged  on the basis of its ability to achieve  those  objectives,  the 
objectives  should  not be chosen  solely by the central bank. Some means 
of  insuring  governmental  input  into  the  process  of  setting  short-run 
objectives needs  to be developed.  Perhaps the best means for incorporat- 
7. Woolley  (1985)  stresses  the  interaction  between  political  pressures  and  central  bank 
independence.  See also Posen  (1993). 
8. Lohmann  (1992) shows  how  discretion  can be combined  with  a governmental  override 
to improve  the tradeoff between  the inflation bias and stabilization. 
9. These results are obtained  in a variant of the model used by Rogoff (1985) and others.  If 
there are velocity  disturbances  that the central bank cannot offset,  then the central bank 
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ing the government  in the setting  of short-run targets is to require that 
such targets, and any changes  in them,  be made public. 
Establishing a legislated  objective for monetary policy, or a performance 
contract more generally, may have little practical consequence  unless  ac- 
companied  by some mechanism  for insuring that the central bank will be 
held accountable  for its performance.  One option is a dismissal  contract 
(Walsh, 1993). Another  is simply to require the central bank to justify its 
policies  publicly  in  terms  of its mandated  objectives.  For this  to work 
requires that the central bank's objective be clearly defined  in terms of a 
specific  price index.  Otherwise,  mandated  objectives  and reporting re- 
quirements  contribute little to establishing  accountability.10  And the gov- 
ernment must also be held accountable with respect to its commitment  to 
the contract with the central bank. While institutionalizing  the delegation 
of monetary policy to the central bank raises the cost to any government  of 
abrogating  the goal of price stability, requiring that any instructions  the 
government  gives to the central bank be given publicly also serves to raise 
the costs to elected  governments  of inflationary policies. 
Attempts  to develop  central banking institutions  must face the issues 
of balancing  the  goal  of  price  stability  with  the  need  for flexibility, of 
restricting  the  scope  of  the  government  to  compromise  price  stability 
with the need  for governmental  involvement  in making short-run trade- 
offs,  and of maintaining  accountability  for policy outcomes.  To see how 
recent  central-banking  reforms  have  addressed  these  issues,  the  next 
two sections  examine  reforms in New  Zealand and in Europe. 
3.  The  New  Zealand  Experience 
The  1989 reform of New  Zealand's  central bank addressed  each of the 
mechanism  design  issues  discussed  in  the  previous  section  in a more 
direct  and  explicit  manner  than  have  other  recent  central-banking  re- 
forms. The purpose  of the Reserve Bank Act, which took effect on Febru- 
ary 1, 1990, was  to establish  a clear and achievable  policy  objective  for 
which  the Reserve Bank of New  Zealand (RBNZ) could be held account- 
able.  In addition,  the Act set up a procedure by which  the government 
and the central bank jointly set shorter-run targets defined  in terms of a 
specific  price index,  defined  a set  of contingencies  under  which  these 
targets could be modified,  and established  a means of enforcing account- 
ability on the part of the official in charge of monetary policy. 
10. An obvious  case in point is the experience  in the U.S., where  the Federal Reserve's use 
of target ranges  for multiple  monetary aggregates  made its performance more difficult 
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The Act,  which  was  passed  with  support  from both major New  Zea- 
land political parties,  specifies  clearly that "The primary function  of the 
Bank  is  to  formulate  and  implement  monetary  policy  directed  to  the 
economic  objective  of achieving  and maintaining  stability in the general 
level  of prices."1  Yet while  the Act establishes  price stability as the sole 
objective  of monetary  policy, the Reserve Bank is not allowed  complete 
discretion  in its pursuit of price stability. Instead,  policy is formulated in 
terms  of  short-run  targets,  and  these  targets are determined  jointly by 
the  government  and  the Reserve  Bank. They may be revised  by agree- 
ment between  the Governor of the Reserve Bank and the Finance Minis- 
ter as long  as any new  targets are recorded in writing and made public. 
Each policy  target agreement,  or PTA, has also included  a definition  of 
price stability, considered  to be an inflation rate of 0-2% as measured  by 
the  Department  of Statistics's  consumer  price index  (CPI), and has  set 
out  conditions  under  which  the  Reserve  Bank might  deviate  from the 
target.  Significantly,  the  developments  that  would  justify  deviations 
from the 0-2%  target range are all aggregate-supply  in nature: terms-of- 
trade price shocks  from external sources,  changes  in indirect tax rates, a 
natural disaster  or major fall in livestock  numbers  due  to disease,  and 
price-level  changes  resulting  from government  levies.  Finally, the Act is 
explicit in assigning  responsibility  for achieving  the targets; according to 
Section  41(1),  "It is  the  duty  of the  Governor  to ensure  that the  Bank 
carries  out  the  functions  imposed  on  it  by  this  Act."  And  failure  to 
achieve  the policy  targets can lead to the removal of the Governor.12 
The  Policy Target Agreement  can be viewed  as an employment  con- 
tract between  the government  and the Governor of the Reserve Bank; it 
spells  out the objectives  for monetary  policy and a specific measure,  the 
CPI  rate  of  inflation,  by  which  the  Governor's  performance  will  be 
judged.  It also  specifies  the conditions  under which  the target inflation 
rate can be  altered.  Given  this  performance  measure,  the  Governor  is 
free to conduct  policy  with  discretion  and  without  direct interference. 
11. In contrast,  the  previous  legislation  (the Reserve  Bank of New  Zealand  Act of  1964) 
listed  ". . . the maintenance  and promotion  of economic  growth  and social welfare  in 
New  Zealand,  having  regard to the desirability of promoting  the highest  level  of pro- 
duction  and  trade  and  full  employment,  and  of  maintaining  a stable  internal  price 
level"  as monetary  policy  objectives  (Section  8, Reserve Bank of New  Zealand  Act of 
1964,  quoted  in  Buckle  and  Stemp,  1991).  Section  10(a) of  the  new  Act  does  state, 
however,  that  in  implementing  monetary  policy  the  Reserve  Bank should  take into 
account  the  "efficiency  and  soundness"  of the financial system.  For a more complete 
discussion  of the Act, see Dawe  (1993) or Walsh (1994). 
12. Unlike  the  situation  in  the  U.S.,  where  a committee  (the  FOMC) is  responsible  for 
monetary  policy  decisions,  the Governor of the Reserve Bank is solely  responsible  for 
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While the government  can alter the Reserve Bank's objective, it must do 
so publicly, thus raising the political costs of deviating from a policy path 
consistent  with  price  stability. Finally, the  Act includes  a clear mecha- 
nism for insuring  accountability  through its threat of dismissal. 
Have  the institutional  changes  instituted  by the Reserve Bank Act re- 
duced  the costs associated  with New  Zealand's disinflation by contribut- 
ing to the credibility of the policy? Debelle (1994) argues that the answer is 
no. Fischer and Orr (1994) find no evidence  that RBNZ announcements  or 
New  Zealand's  legislative  changes  had any effect on mean  survey mea- 
sures of perceived  or expected  monetary conditions. 
Figure 1 shows  the recent behavior of New  Zealand's  rate of inflation 
as measured  by the CPI. Also  shown  is the mean expected  inflation rate 
based on the Reserve Bank Survey of Expectations. This series, based on 
a regular survey  conducted  by the RBNZ, gives  the mean  inflation rate 
respondents  expected  to occur over the next 12 months.  For each date, 
the figure shows  the realized inflation rate over the previous  12 months 
and the annual inflation rate expected  by survey respondents  12 months 
earlier. As  others  have  noted  (Fischer, Debelle),  the  Reserve  Bank has 
apparently  had  to "earn" the reductions  in expected  inflation; expecta- 
tions  fell only  after actual inflation  was  reduced.  This is consistent  with 
the evidence  on targeting credibility found  by Svensson  (1993). His test 
for credibility rejects inflation-target  credibility in New  Zealand prior to 
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mid-1992; the test fails to reject credibility after mid-1992. By the middle 
of 1992, the Reserve Bank had succeeded  in keeping  inflation within  the 
0-2%  target band  for over 6 months;  credibility of the targeting regime 
was established  by that success and not simply by the legislative changes 
incorporated  in the Reserve Bank Act. 
The  conclusion  that the  major institutional  reforms in New  Zealand 
failed to produce  a "credibility bonus"  may be too pessimistic.  Relying 
on  comparisons  of  actual  inflation  and  expected  inflation  in  order  to 
measure  credibility can be problematic,  since unforecastable fluctuations 
in  inflation  can  cause  actual inflation  to differ from expected  inflation 
even  when  policy  is  credible.  This  problem  can  be  avoided  to  some 
degree  by comparing  the Reserve Bank's own  forecasts of inflation with 
private-sector  expectations  about  inflation.  This  has  been  done  by 
Hutchison  (1995). He finds  that the average gap between  the Survey of 
Expectations  and the Reserve Bank's inflation forecast fell after the pas- 
sage  of the Act.  Thus,  the institutional  reforms were  associated  with  a 
convergence  of  the  public's  inflation  expectations  and  the  Reserve 
Bank's inflation  forecasts,  a result that is consistent  with the hypothesis 
that  the  reforms  helped  to  generate  credibility  for the  disinflationary 
policies.  Actual inflation fell much faster than the Reserve Bank (and the 
public)  had  forecast,  leading  to  the  appearance  that  expectations  fell 
only after the actual reductions  in inflation. 
There is no question  of the RBNZ's greater commitment  to low infla- 
tion  today  than  in  the  early  1980s.  In  part,  the  institutional  reforms 
reflect  that commitment  rather than  the  other way  around.  New  Zea- 
land's  reforms  are likely to have  a continuing  influence  on the conduct 
of monetary  policy, in large part because  the new  structure provides  an 
integrated  linkage  from  the  objective  of  policy  (price  stability)  to  the 
short-run  path  designed  to achieve  the objective  (the PTA and  specific 
inflation  targets)  to  a  system  of  insuring  accountability  (potential  dis- 
missal  for the  Governor  and  public  scrutiny  for any  government  that 
alters  policy  targets).  However,  the  new  policy-making  structure  is 
largely  untested.  The  RBNZ is  now  forecasting  that CPI inflation  will 
exceed  3% in  1995 but has  argued  that its own  estimate  of underlying 
inflation  will  peak at 1.9%, still within  the 0-2%  range.  And  the mean 
expected  rate in the December  1994 survey  for the year ending  Septem- 
ber 1995 was  2.5%, a rate above the 0-2% range in the PTA. The moves 
by the RBNZ to redefine  the measure  of inflation in order to stay within 
the  0-2%  range  suggests  that  the  Act's  careful  attempts  to  enforce 
accountability  can be  circumvented  (Spiegel,  1995). And  the  power  of 
the dismissal  clause will be tested  as actual inflation rises above 2% this 
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4.  Reforms  in Europe 
I focus on four proposed  or enacted changes affecting central banks in the 
EU: the  statutes  of the  European  Central Bank (ECB) contained  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty, the legislative  changes  for the Banque de France that 
went into effect in January 1994, the inflation targeting procedure adopted 
in the U.K. in October 1992, and the recommendations  of a private study 
sponsored  by the Centre for Economic Policy (Roll et al., 1993), which has 
put forward specific proposals for the reform of the Bank of England. Since 
the Maastricht Treaty  requires, as a condition of joining the proposed mone- 
tary union, that individual member nations make the structure of their cen- 
tral banks consistent  with  that of the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
Banque de France provides  an example of how  this requirement is being 
met, while the developments  in the U.K. provide a somewhat  contrasting 
attempt to establish a commitment  to low inflation. From the contracting 
perspective,  the European reforms have emphasized  the need  to restrict 
elected governments  over the need to ensure that the short-run trade-offs 
made  by the central bank reflect public preferences  and that the central 
bank faces some  degree of accountability for its performance. 
The Maastricht Treaty sets out the institutional structure of the ECB  and 
addresses  some of the design issues that the contracting approach empha- 
sizes are of critical importance.13  It makes the maintenance  of price stabil- 
ity the primary objective of the ECB. In principle,  this provides  a clearly 
defined  performance measure  that could be used to gauge the success  or 
failure of the ECB and, at least potentially, is consistent  with the contract- 
ing approach's  use of incentives  based on realized inflation. 
In its  pursuit  of  price  stability, the  ECB is granted  a high  degree  of 
independence  from political influence and wide latitude for discretion. In 
fact, the ECB was clearly designed  to restrict elected governments'  control 
over monetary  policy. Insulation  from political pressures  is achieved  by 
explicitly prohibiting the ECB from accepting instructions from the mem- 
ber governments  of the EC (although the President of the European Coun- 
cil  may  participate  without  vote  in  meetings  of  the  ECB governing 
council),  and members  of the governing  board are to have long (8-year), 
nonrenewable  terms.  The ECB is directed to support the general policy of 
the EC, but only if the objective of price stability is not jeopardized. 
Because central banks inevitably face trade-offs in the short-run imple- 
mentation  of policy,  the  contracting  approach  showed  that basing  the 
central bank's performance on the realized rate of inflation alone will not 
lead to optimal stabilization unless  the central bank shares society's pref- 
13. For more detailed  discussion  of the ECB, see,  for example,  Fratianni, von Hagen,  and 
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erences.  Nothing  in the design  of the ECB insures  this will be the case, 
and,  as argued earlier, an independent  central bank may have an incen- 
tive to focus  exclusively  on inflation at the cost of stabilization goals. 
The contracting approach also draws attention to the need for account- 
ability. The  Maastricht Treaty provides  no  clear means  through  which 
the ECB will be held accountable  for achieving  the goal of price stability. 
In fact, establishing  nonrenewable  terms for the members of the govern- 
ing board removes  a potential  channel  for insuring  accountability. Fail- 
ure to provide  a specific definition  of price stability also serves to reduce 
the public's  ability to evaluate  the ECB's performance.  The only  formal 
requirement that may serve an oversight function is the requirement that 
the ECB publish  quarterly reports and present  an annual  report to the 
European Parliament. 
The Maastricht Treaty requires that members  of the proposed  mone- 
tary union  revise  their national  central banking  legislation  to be consis- 
tent  with  the  ECB. In January 1994,  France met  this  requirement  by 
implementing  revised statutes for the Banque de France. Like the govern- 
ing accord for the ECB, the Banque de France is directed to pursue price 
stability as its primary objective. However,  France's new legislation  goes 
on to state that the Banque de France "shall carry out these duties within 
the  framework  of  the  Government's  overall  economic  policy."14 And 
while  the  Banque  de France "shall neither  seek nor accept instructions 
from the  Government,"  the  Prime Minister and Minister for Economic 
Affairs  may  attend  and  submit  proposals  at  meetings  of  the  policy- 
making  council  (although  they  may  not  vote).  This participation  may 
serve to insure  that the Banque de France does  not focus exclusively  on 
price stability in its conduct of policy, but there is no mechanism  that ties 
short-run performance  to an easily monitored  outcome. 
Nor is there a specific means  of insuring accountability. The Governor 
and  the  two  Deputy  Governors  of the Banque de France may be reap- 
pointed  once  (each term of office is 6 years),  but reappointment  is not 
conditional  on any well-defined  and publicly verifiable measure  of per- 
formance,  such as price stability, and is therefore more likely to provide a 
means for political influence  than for enforcing accountability.15  The Gov- 
14. The current governor of the Banque de France, Jean-Claude Trichet (appointed  Septem- 
ber 1993), has said, "Independent  central banks, where they exist, must, in one form or 
another,  support  the general economic  policies of their country without  prejudicing,  of 
course,  their monetary  independence"  (quoted in The Banker,  February 7, 1994). 
15. The  other  six  members  of  the  Banque  de  France's Policy Council  are chosen  by  the 
government  from lists  submitted  by the National  Assembly,  the Senate,  and the Eco- 
nomic  and Social Council.  These  six will  serve staggered  9-year nonrenewable  terms. 
As  shown  by Waller (1992), the presence  of staggered  terms can serve  to restrict the 
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ernor of the Banque de France is required to appear at least twice a year 
before  the  National  Assembly  and  Senate,  but the  Governor  is not re- 
quired publicly  to set short-run  targets that might  serve as a means  for 
providing  some  degree  of  accountability  in  the  conduct  of  monetary 
policy. 
In the  U.K.,  the  Bank of England  has not been  granted  greater legal 
independence  of  the  government,  nor  has  any  policy  objective  been 
mandated  by law. Instead,  the government  has formulated inflation tar- 
gets that serve as goals within which monetary policy is conducted.  This 
policy  framework  was  introduced  in late  1992. Rather than  defining  a 
goal  of price stability, an inflation  rate of  1-4%  serves  as the medium- 
term target of policy, with a 2% target serving  as a longer-run goal. The 
move  to an inflation  target was  not accompanied  by any increase in the 
Bank of England's  legal  independence,  nor are the inflation  targets le- 
gally  binding.  However,  the  practical independence  of  the  Bank has 
been  increased  by the establishment  of a new  relationship  between  the 
Chancellor  of the Exchequer and the Bank; the minutes  of the meetings 
between  the  Governor  of the  Bank of England  and  the  Chancellor  are 
now  made  public.  The Bank is also  to publish  quarterly a report on its 
policies for achieving  the inflation targets. Because these changes are not 
established  in law, the degree  to which  they represent a commitment  to 
price stability is unclear. 
By way  of  contrast,  the  Roll Panel  (Roll et al.,  1993) has  provided  a 
detailed  proposal  for  legislative  reform  of  the  Bank of  England.  The 
panel  recommended  that Parliament amend  the  1946 Bank of England 
Act to specify  price stability as the sole objective of policy, thereby estab- 
lishing  a formal mandate for policy more in line with that of the ECB and 
the  Banque  de  France. The Roll Panel recommendations  would  reduce 
the  direct role of the  government  by giving  the  Bank of England  com- 
plete discretion  in setting monetary  policy. The government  would  have 
the ability to override  the proposed  statutory goal of price stability, but 
only  through  an Act of Parliament "of limited duration." Thus,  the Roll 
Panel is more in line with the ECB and French frameworks in not follow- 
ing the New  Zealand  model  of involving  the government  directly in the 
setting  of short-run targets for inflation. 
The Roll Panel does  recommend  that the Bank of England announce 
short-run  inflation  targets.  It  argues  that  such  targets,  expressed  in 
terms of a single  objective,  make it easier to monitor policy performance. 
In  addition,  the  Governor  would  be  answerable  before  a  Parliament 
Select  Committee.  As  the  contracting  work  has  shown,  a central bank 
will  pursue  appropriate  stabilization  policies  only  if it shares  society's 
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with the sole objective of achieving  price stability may neglect the stabili- 
zation role monetary  policy can play in the short run. 
Several key differences  exist between  the New  Zealand approach and 
the  European  alternatives.  First,  the  approach  in  Europe  has  placed 
greater emphasis  on  restricting the  ability of governments  to influence 
monetary  policy  and  less  emphasis  on  adjudicating  potential  disagree- 
ments  between  central banks  and governments.  Second,  New  Zealand 
has incorporated  more mechanisms  to insure  accountability on the part 
of the central bank than Europe has. The reforms in Europe rely heavily 
on strict political independence  and public announcements  by the cen- 
tral bank to enforce  accountability  and enhance  the credibility of policy. 
While the New  Zealand reforms also have emphasized  the role of public 
announcements  as  a means  of  constraining  government  influence  on 
policy, the potential  of dismissal  for failing to achieve the PTA goals does 
provide  a  stronger  enforcement  mechanism  than  exists  in  any  of  the 
European plans. 
5.  Conclusions 
The mechanism  design  or contracting  approach  offers insights  that are 
relevant  for the recent discussions  of institutionalizing  price stability as 
the sole goal of monetary policy. If monetary policy has little effect on the 
real economy-as  most economists  accept as a reasonable description  in 
the long run-then  the price level is the obvious  choice as a performance 
measure  for the  central bank,  and a high-powered  incentive  scheme  is 
optimal.  That  is,  the  central  bank  should  be  punished  for deviations 
from price stability; such punishment  might take the form of a dismissal 
rule. A formal mandate  that establishes  price stability as the sole objec- 
tive  of  monetary  policy  would  seem  to  be  an  appropriate  means  of 
institutionalizing  such a contract. 
In the short run, however,  monetary policy has important real effects, 
and policymakers  must  inevitably  make tradeoffs between  multiple  ob- 
jectives.  In such  an environment,  optimal  incentive  schemes  are more 
difficult to design,  since performance  is hard to measure.  Low-powered 
schemes  are appropriate,  perhaps  combined  with some limits on central 
bank flexibility. Short-run inflation  targets that are publicly  announced 
provide  a means  of formulating  policy that is consistent  with longer-run 
price  stability  while  serving  as  benchmarks  for  judging  the  central 
bank's actions.  If central banks have a bias towards focusing  excessively 
on inflation,  it may be necessary  for the government  to play some role in 
setting  short-run targets. 
Of the central-banking reforms discussed,  New Zealand's policy struc- Recent Central-Bank  Reforms  and the Role of Price Stability *  251 
ture most  resembles  a performance  contract. It has well-defined  proce- 
dures involving  both the central bank and the government  for the setting 
of  short-run  targets,  and  it contains  a system  to insure  accountability 
through the requirement that any government  override be made publicly 
and  through  the  dismissal  of  the  central bank  governor  if targets  are 
missed.  As  yet,  however,  this  system  has  not  really been  tested;  the 
projected  inflation  increases  for 1995 will constitute  its first real test.  In 
Europe,  the  ECB and  the  Banque  de France have  mandates  to achieve 
price stability, but their institutional  frameworks do not insure that they 
will  have  the  correct incentives  to  address  short-run  policy  tradeoffs. 
Neither the ECB nor the Banque de France is required to announce  short- 
run targets  that could  be used  to evaluate  their performance.  The Roll 
Panel proposals  do require that short-run targets be set by the Bank of 
England,  but the recommendations  do not incorporate a mechanism  to 
insure  that  appropriate  stabilization  policies  are followed.  Finally, the 
current targeting  procedures  employed  in the U.K. represent  the least 
institutionalized  commitment  of any of the reforms discussed. 
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